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Abstract
We study the discursive resonance of online climate skepticism in traditional media in Ger-
many, a country where climate skeptics lack public prestige and thus form a political
counter-movement. We thereby differentiate two temporal dynamics: resonance can be
continuous or selective, based on the exploitation of specific events. Beyond, we test
whether such resonance is higher within the conservative media. We rely on news value
theory to shed light on the mechanism facilitating or hindering such resonance and identify
three indicators for resonance: frames, positions and actors. Using various computational
methods as well as qualitative case studies, we examine the skeptical and traditional media
discourses over a period of two years. Our analysis shows that there is no continuous reso-
nance. However, our data reveal selective resonance: skeptics’ manage to exploit specific
events pushing their frames and positions onto traditional media’s agenda. Thereby, conser-
vative media did not give greater resonance to climate skeptical voices whereas they resort
to downplaying the issue by allocating less space to it.
1. Introduction
Anthropogenic climate change is one of the most fundamental problems the world is facing,
and it presents a threat to the global community [1]. Although there is scientific consensus
that climate change is occurring, that the rise in temperature is predominantly due to human
activity, that it has severe consequences for ecological systems, and that only a sharp reduction
in CO2 emissions can limit climate change, political efforts have been lacking. One reason for
the impasse is the counter-mobilization of climate skeptics [2], who have run campaigns that
cast doubt on the scientific consensus and those responsible for it—the climate scientists. Cli-
mate skeptics and their spokespersons in the media and politics have been stunningly success-
ful in the US, where not only conservative citizens forcefully reject climate politics [3] but also
the Trump administration. By contrast, in most European countries those defending the
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climate consensus, the climate advocates, (still) dominate political institutions (e.g., [4]), tradi-
tional mass media (e.g., [5]), and public opinion (e.g., [6, 7]) with climate skeptics being in the
role of counter-movements [8].
Such counter-movements, however, use another venue, the Internet, to push their ideas
[9]. Here, climate skeptics are more active and visible compared to climate advocates in
European countries, building connections with conservative media and transnational allies
[10, 11], and even imposing their frames onto the agenda of climate advocates [12]. Yet, so
far, research has hardly analyzed (for an exception, see [13]) whether there is any connec-
tion between climate skeptical online communication and the coverage in traditional media
and politics (for this research deficit, see [11, 14]). The neglect of studying discursive reso-
nance among venues is all the more surprising as research for the US convincingly shows
that the discourse in the traditional channels influences public perceptions [3]: polarized
media discourses lead to polarized public perceptions. Beyond, research so far has primarily
focused on the US where climate skeptics are strong and prestigious. We, however, focus on
climate skeptics as a political counter-movement and ask: How is the discursive resonance
of online climate skepticism shaped in traditional media when climate skeptics lack public
prestige?
This study seeks to make three contributions. First, our study connects venues that have
mostly been examined separately, as research has focused either on climate skeptics’ online
communication (e.g., [10, 11, 14]; for a summary, see [9]), or on their visibility in traditional
media (e.g., [5, 15–17]), or on their strength in parliamentary settings (e.g., [4, 18]). By com-
paring the discourses across venues, we contribute to a better understanding of the conditions
that lead to greater resonance of counter-movement ideas in mainstream discourses. Second,
as climate skeptics are organized across national borders [2], we take into account the potential
transnational flow of ideas, via the web, into national arenas. Finally, we apply computational
approaches to the analysis of the core of political contests. They allow—in contrast to manual
techniques—to study discursive resonance among different venues, outlets and over longer-
time periods and thus grasp different temporal dynamics of resonance as well as different pat-
terns of resonance among outlets.
To answer our research question, we first look at climate change skeptics as political
counter-movement that lacks public prestige. We then turn to the theoretical mechanisms by
which these political counter-movements may resonate with traditional media and then
develop indicators to measure such resonance. Before turning to the results, we elaborate on
the methods employed and elaborate why we focus on Germany. The paper concludes with
discussing the implications of our study.
1.1 Climate skeptics as political counter-movement
Following Rahmstorf [19], climate skeptics either fully deny or cast doubt on the fact that
global warming is taking place (trend skepticism), that humans are the main drivers of it (attri-
bution skepticism), and/or that climate change is leading to severe consequences (impact skep-
ticism). In addition, climate skeptics may also cast doubt on those producing scientific
evidence (consensus skepticism, see e.g., [20]) or may question the relevance of binding policy
regulations (policy skepticism, see e.g., [21, 22]). Previous research has shown that climate
skepticism is often linked to certain worldviews and beliefs, such as conservatism and the sup-
port for free unregulated markets [23, 24]. Climate skepticism, however, is more than an indi-
vidual attitude. Climate skeptics in the US have built what Dunlap and McRight [23] call a
“climate change denial machine,” [23 p147] in which conservative politicians, media, and blog-
gers work hand in hand with think tanks and interest groups.
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While climate skepticism has been characterized as a counter-movement [2, 25, 26]—or
counter-coalition [11] based on its counter-status to scientific results [27]—the political status
of climate skeptics varies greatly between countries. They are far from being a minority in the
US, which has been cited as a country where climate change denial has progressed to a point of
becoming the official presidential doctrine; but other countries such as Norway or Australia
also show strong forms of climate skepticism (e.g., [6, 20]). However, in countries like Ger-
many, climate change skeptics are more marginal. In such countries, they are political counter-
movements in the sense of Fraser [8]: that are groups in society that put forward a minority
position and, as a consequence, are excluded from the mainstream debate.
Unsurprisingly perhaps, most research on climate skepticism focus on the US case (for a
critique, see [20])—the country in which climate skeptics are strongest and hardly excluded
from mainstream debates. For the US, the climate change denial machine is well described [2,
13, 25, 28], with detailed findings on climate skeptics’ appearances in the media (e.g., [15, 29,
30]), in the (English-speaking) online world (e.g., [10, 14, 26]), and in politics (e.g., [18]). If we
turn, however, to those countries in which climate skeptics are still political counter-move-
ments, our knowledge is limited. While some research focused on appearances of skeptics in
traditional media (often in comparison to the US; e.g., [5, 16, 31–33]), only few studies ana-
lyzed the presence of climate change skeptics in parliamentary arenas [4]. Other research has
focused on skeptics’ online communication in these countries [9, 11, 12, 31]. Yet, to our
knowledge, research has failed to study how separated the political counter-movement still is
or whether we can observe discursive resonance between counter-movements debates (mostly
conducted online) and mainstream discourses.
Research so far has remained primarily on a descriptive level, focusing on the degree of cli-
mate skepticism in different venues. Bringing these venues together seems all the more neces-
sary as Fraser [8] has already pointed out that counter-movements follow two goals: Through
their internal communication they develop a group identity, whereas their external communi-
cation is directed towards the mainstream public. Investigating the connection between cli-
mate skeptics’ online discourses and the wider public is all the more important as research has
shown that climate skeptics fully exploit the affordance provided by the internet, regardless of
their status in traditional arenas (e.g., [11, 12, 14, 26, 31]); they can bypass journalistic gate-
keepers, and directly connect with like-minded others across national borders. However,
whether their strength in online communication matters for other arenas is still to be shown.
This requires the study of the intersection of discourses between different venues (for this
desideratum, see also [16, 34]). Theoretically, thereby three scenarios are possible: if discourses
remain separated, the public is fragmented into mainstream and counter-public. If discourses
resonate which each other, it might well be that counter debates take up ideas of the main-
stream. With the omnipresence of the mainstream debates, such resonance is quite likely.
However, what is politically more relevant and thus of utter interest to us, is the more unlikely
case that political counter-movements manage to resonate within the mainstream. Research
clearly shows that such actors do not have routine access to established channels. Their success
therefore depends largely on their resonance in the mainstream discourse [35–37].
1.2 Political counter-movements and mechanisms for media resonance
To better understand the mechanisms that lead to discursive resonance we employ a dual per-
spective that takes into account the activities of the climate skeptical counter-movement and
the working routines of media coverage. Counter-movements such as climate skeptics seek
public visibility to gain a voice in political debates and affect their outcome [8]. Even in hybrid
communication environments [38], traditional media coverage still plays a crucial role in
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amplifying voices of actors, their positions and viewpoints. Being at a disadvantage vis-à-vis
established actors, counter-movement actors rely on discursive strategies to pursue their goals,
knowing that they fit all the better into the news cycle the more they adapt to the narrative
needs and working routines of the media [39].
According to news value theory, journalists evaluate events based on specific professional selec-
tion criteria—the news factors—with regard to their worthiness of publication and prominence in
the coverage (e.g., [40–43]). In the case of climate change, one of the strategies pursued by climate
skeptics is to voice doubt about fundamental aspects such as climate science, as this ties readily to
the news factor “conflict”, increases the newsworthiness of the coverage and thus their chance of
being included in news reports [15]. It has already been argued that the news factor “conflict”
eases the resonance of skeptic ideas within mainstream journalistic debate [15]. Beyond this, we
may argue that the news factor “surprise” pushes skeptics’ ideas onto the agendas. The downside
of this strategy is that it risks losing much of its newsworthiness after a while, unless climate skep-
tics succeed in introducing new, unexpected perspectives to the debate that emphasize the news
factor “surprise”. Finally, climate skeptics can attempt to rely on the prestige of some of the mem-
bers of the counter-movement and thus emphasize the news factor “status/elite”.
In countries where climate skeptics are still a minority movement and do not command the
necessary status, getting media visibility is less likely for them. This prestige factor is all the
more important as research strongly shows that legacy media have a bias towards the elites
[35, 36]. With regard to climate change skeptics, we can thus ask:
(RQ1): How is the discursive resonance of online climate skepticism shaped in traditional
media coverage when climate change skeptics lack public prestige?
As we have seen above, news value theory suggests that the more news factors are attached
to an event or issue and the stronger they are, the higher the chance that it is taken up by the
media. Thereby, media coverage is driven by two different temporal dynamics. First, some
news factors grant continuous media resonance. This is most likely the case for actors com-
manding a high level of prestige as the news factor “status / elite” describes a continuous (social
and) discursive quality. Furthermore, prestigious actors on the climate skeptical side would
allow the counter-movement to promote the position and their perspectives. Second and in
contrast to this, counter-movements might rely on the creation of specific events—or their
exploitation, to generate selective media resonance. The news factor “surprise” is clearly
related to this discursive strategy. We are thus interested which types of resonance we observe
in countries where climate skeptics lack prestige and thus ask:
(RQ2): Is there rather a continuous or a selective congruence between the online communica-
tion of climate skeptics and traditional media coverage?
Finally, researchers have started to question whether news factors are perceived similarly
among different news outlets (e.g., [43]). This so-called “two-component” theory assumes that
news factors as characteristics of events are perceived differently by journalists depending on
the political orientation of the outlets. In the US for instance conservative media ascribe
greater news value to the ideas of climate skeptics [23, 26, 32, 44]. This conservative alliance
structure has also been shown for countries in which counter-movements still have a minority
status. Here, specific conservative newspapers publish skeptics’ claims [5], and skeptics closely
connect via hyperlinks to these right-wing media outlets [11]. Consequently, our study exam-
ines the following question:
(RQ3): Is there a special connection with regard to the discursive resonance between climate
skeptics and conservative media?
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1.3 Political counter-movements and indicators for media resonance
To determine the degree of congruence between the online communication of the climate
skeptical counter-movement and traditional media coverage, and how it develops over time,
we distinguish three different discursive dimensions [45]: (1) issues and frames, (2) the posi-
tions articulated, and (3) the visibility of actors. The more we see frames, positions and actors
converge between the two venues, the more we can speak of a discursive resonance. If we see
that skeptic frames, positions and actors resonate with the mainstream, the plausibility is high
that the counter-movement has succeeded in spreading their ideas; whereas if frames, posi-
tions and actors from the mainstream turn more prominent in skeptics’ discourse, the oppo-
site is the case. However, the methods employed in this paper, do not allow us to draw any
direct conclusion as to causal direction.
Skeptical issues and frames. Following Fraser [8], counter-movements are excluded from
mainstream debate. Consequently, one of their central goals is to make their issues and frames vis-
ible to a wider public. From a classical agenda-building perspective [46] this means that counter-
movements seek to raise awareness of those issues that are important for them and try to frame
debates from their viewpoint. In well-established issues, where the agenda is largely set by tradi-
tional media and political institutions, counter-movements primarily seek to re-frame the debate
by promoting alternative views on an issue such as climate change. They attempt to shift “central
organizing idea[s] or story line[s] that provide [. . .] meaning to an unfolding strip of events [. . .]
The frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue” [47 p143].
On the thematic level, climate skeptics do this by sowing doubt where there is (scientific)
consensus, with the aim to draw climate advocates into a debate where contrarian positions
might gain the upper hand [48]. Studies for the US [13] have shown that a positive semantic
relation between climate skeptic’s online communication and traditional media coverage may
occur, documenting the responsiveness of the media to contrarian ideas and thus the success
of this strategy. In this perspective, an increase of skeptics’ frames on the media agenda might
be taken as an indicator for discursive resonance independent of the fact, whether media
counter-argue these frames or not. Pure visibility of frames matters [49].
Skeptical positions. Frames are only part of the discursive structure of a debate; equally
important is the question whose position is being covered by the media. After all, climate skep-
tical frames can just as well be reported from a critical viewpoint that effectively undermines
their credibility. When for instance climate skeptics succeed in provoking a debate about the
uncertainty of scientific results (which is a classic skeptics’ frame, see [12]), mass media may
decide to give voice to mainstream scientists who contest this frame. Similarly, journalists
might not follow climate skeptical framing, but include their counter-position.
Climate skeptical participants in debates. In addition to frames and positions, counter-
movements attempt to promote specific representatives of their cause, in an attempt to expand
the range of legitimate participants in the debate. These actors gain visibility in two ways,
either as speakers or addressees. In the first case, they may be spokespersons who relate the
view of a skeptical think tank. This form of visibility is closely associated with the positional
dimension introduced above. In such a setting, journalists use the counter-movement’s repre-
sentatives as “opportune witnesses” [50] to make climate change skepticism more prominent.
Second, climate skeptics may gain visibility as objects of reporting. In this role, they are ratified
by other actors positively or negatively. Yet, in both instances, the counter-movement succeeds
in gaining visibility in mainstream debates, which helps turn it into a legitimate actor.
Table 1 shows the different dimensions of climate skeptical discourse. To simplify the ana-
lytical framework, we distinguish four core types according to the thematic and positional
dimensions. We use the actor dimension to further specify the typology.
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If frames and positions of counter-movements are mirrored in the coverage of mainstream
media, we speak of full resonance. Pure positional resonance occurs if only the positions of
counter-movements are reported, yet within the mainstream discourse. For climate skeptics,
this would, for example, mean that their skeptical positions receive attention within the larger
mainstream debate about the role of renewable energy in the transition from fossil fuels to a
greener society. This indicator looks for the pure attention of skeptical positions without tak-
ing into account whether journalists counter-argue. However, research points out that visibil-
ity matters independent of the evaluations surrounding it [49]. By contrast, we speak of pure
thematic congruence if the frames promoted by counter-movements become more promi-
nently part of the relevance structure of the mainstream debate around climate change with-
out, however, finding a parallel increase in their positions. Such a setting occurs if climate
skeptical frames such as the credibility of scientific studies, receive attention in mainstream
debates, though the skeptical position associated with it is dismissed. The media would cover
the perspective promoted by climate skeptics but explicitly reject it, arguing for instance that
climate science is credible, and scientific results confirm the trends established by previous
research. Finally, if neither skeptical counter-movement frames nor positions resonate in the
media, the counter-movement discourse remains segregated from the mainstream [8].
Full, positional and thematic resonance can be further classified according to whether skeptical
actors gain visibility in the coverage and thus are ratified as legitimate participants in the debate.
The more climate skeptical actors become visible together with their position and/or their frames,
the more they succeed in becoming part of the debate on their own terms. Conversely, the less cli-
mate skeptical actors are mentioned in the coverage together with frames and/or positions, the
more the debate is shaped by journalist and other actors such as mainstream politicians.
2. Case selection, data, and methods
2.1 Case selection
To study the discursive resonance between the (potentially transnational) online communica-
tion of climate skeptics and traditional media, we focus on Germany. Germany represents an
ideal case as climate skepticism was a small but significant phenomenon in traditional media
[51], parliamentary arenas [4, 52], and public opinion [6, 20] during the period of analysis
(June 2012 –June 2014). However, this wide-spread acceptance of man-made climate change
does not mean that there was an equally high level of agreement on political measures. Any-
how, our design allows to search for initial resonance increase among venues. Thereby,
research for Germany also shows that climate skeptics successfully exploit the online world;
although fewer in number, climate skeptics are more visible and more active online and more
strongly connect to transnational allies compared to climate advocates [11].
In such a setting, it is possible to observe whether and how ideas from the political counter-
movement may flow into mainstream debates, whereas such flows of ideas are hard to detect
Table 1. Types of discursive resonance.
Frame resonance
Yes No
Positional
resonance
Yes Full resonance: Counter-movement frames
and positions become more central in the
mainstream coverage
Positional resonance: counter-movement
positions become more central in the
mainstream coverage
No Frame resonance: Counter-movement frames
become more central in the mainstream
coverage
No resonance: Counter-movement
discourse remains marginal in the
mainstream coverage
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240089.t001
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in those countries where climate skeptics are not a minority movement anymore as their ideas
are already visible in all channels. The German setting, thus, may allow us to understand the
spread of ideas, respectively, the conditions under which policy monopolies are destructed
[53] by redefining the issue, by changing the positions formulated, or by changing the partici-
pants of the debate. This is even more interesting as some researchers have claimed that cli-
mate skeptics seem to be gaining attention and terrain in Germany: Brunnengräber [54]
posited that climate skepticism is increasingly gaining societal acceptance, and Schmid-Petri
and Arlt [55] show that climate skeptical arguments have slightly increased in mainstream
German media over recent years.
2.2 Collecting data on the counter-movements’ communication
To study skeptics’ communication, we studied their online communication—the field in
which they are most active. Hereby, we relied on hyperlink issue networks that originate from
prominent counter-movement actors. We thereby followed the logic of snowball sampling—a
method employed if researchers have limited knowledge about the overall population. Such
method allows to detect also those skeptics that are less-known.
To identify relevant skeptics, we relied on a six-step procedure shown in Fig 1. First, we
selected the four most important civil society actors of the climate skeptical counter-movement
in Germany as starting points based on expert interviews, literature reviews, and country-spe-
cific Google searches (with deleted search histories). These are Analyse+Aktion, EIKE—Euro-
päisches Institut für Klima und Energie, Klimaskeptiker, and Klimaüberraschung. We chose
civil society actors as they show the broadest linking behavior [56] and because they are the
“champions of online communication” [9 p530]. Second, starting from the actors’ main cli-
mate pages (list of URLs in S1 Appendix), crawling software (called Issuecrawler [57]) col-
lected all hyperlinks two levels deep within the websites and all of those that pointed to other
websites. We limited our snowball crawling to go only one step “out” as pre-studies have
shown that further crawling substantially increases the number of pages that do not deal with
climate change. Third, to make sure that only pages that were relevant to the climate debate
remained in our network, we indexed all pages according to our keywords (i.e., “Klimawan-
del,” “globale Erwärmung,” “globaler Erwärmung,” “globalen Erwärmung”). We only indexed
content that was publicly available, i.e. not password-protected. Also, we respected the robots
exclusion standard (robots.txt). This standard allows website owners to define areas of their
website that should not be scanned or indexed by robots (e.g. search engines, web crawlers). In
this way, we made sure that the content was permitted for download by the website owners.
Fig 1. Online sampling procedure.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240089.g001
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Fourth, some data preparation was necessary. We aggregated single web pages and domains
that belonged to the same actors. This allowed us, in a fifth step, to attribute a position on cli-
mate change and a type of actor to each of the identified actors. To do so, we applied a manual
content analysis, based on information found on the “About us” pages or similar sections of
the website and conducted by two trained coders. They distinguished, position-wise, between
climate skeptics, climate advocates, and climate neutrals (with no clear-cut position); separated
legacy media from other actors; and coded their scope/country of activity (distinguishing a
total of 199 geographical areas). Note that according to our definition, a climate skeptic is
someone who explicitly questions at least one of the following: the existence of climate change,
the human contribution to it, the science of climate change and/or its findings, projected
trends/consequences of climate change, and/or the adaptation to it. By this definition, a cli-
mate skeptic is also someone who endorses the science but negates, for instance, its political
and economic consequences. In turn, a climate advocate explicitly supports at least one of
these points without doubting any of the others. The actors’ attributes were classified by two
trained coders. The reliability of their classification was assessed by comparing them with a
master coding and was calculated using Krippendorff’s alpha, which is a common statistical
measure of the agreement between different coders when coding the same texts. The agree-
ment is usually measured on the level of individual variables. The test revealed satisfactory
results with Krippendorff’s Alpha of .90 for the position variable, .90 for the actor type variable,
and .93 for the scope variable. In the final step, only those actors and their communication that
put forward climate skeptical positions and were not rated as legacy media remained in our
sample, which serves as a proxy for climate skeptics’ communication (154 different actors with
a total of 13,009 unique web pages). Climate skeptics’ online communication here originates
from prominent German climate skeptics from civil society, but then it is extended by snow-
ball sampling to include text material from all types of skeptical non-legacy-media actors. As
shown in Table 2, however, non-profit civil society actors and individual private persons
account for the vast majority of the web pages in the final sample. Out of the 154 different
actors, 33 are domestic actors from Germany with a primarily national scope, and 121 are for-
eign actors (either with a foreign national or transnational scope).
We collected such online communication data of climate skeptics once a month over a
period of two years (2012–14). We are aware that this proxy captures only part of climate skep-
tics’ communication, omitting, for example, online communication via social media (e.g.,
[58]). However, as actors are active on all venues and as research has shown that hyperlinking,
i.e. referring to another actor by linking to its web presence, is closely related to social media
and the interactions there [59], we are confident that such a partial approach might capture
the relevant content of skeptics’ online communication (see for a similar argument, [60]).
Table 2. Key figures of the skeptics’ online sample.
Actors Webpages
Domicile German actors 33 3’549
Foreign actors 121 9’490
Type Politicians, political actors 3 3
Socioeconomic pressure groups, companies 4 22
Non-profit civil society actors 45 3’779
Genuine online media 26 216
Citizens / private persons 74 8’977
Other actors 2 12
Total 154 13’009
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240089.t002
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2.3 Collecting data on mainstream debates in traditional media
We regard the national print media landscape (whether online or offline) as a good proxy for
the mainstream debate. Research has shown that mass media have an elitist focus [35, 36] and,
as such, are likely to reflect the mainstream debate. For Germany, we have selected the 15 most
important daily and weekly newspapers as well as magazines with a national audience reach
(see S2 Appendix). All of these outlets are regarded as national opinion-leaders. Within these
outlets, we identified all relevant articles on climate change by searching for the above-men-
tioned keywords in the databases of Factiva and LexisNexis. This resulted in 4,111 articles
about climate change in the observed period in German legacy media.
To find out whether discourse resonance is especially strong as regards the conservative
media landscape, we finally classified the newspapers and magazines in our sample according
to their ideological position. Following the work of Beck [61 pp153-155], Begenat [62 pp98-
99], Lüter [63], Maurer and Reinemann [64 pp129-130], Pew Research Center [65], Schwarz-
Friesel [66 p52], and Wessler and Rinke [67 p640], we identified the following nine legacy
media as right of the center: Bild, Bild am Sonntag, Die Welt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
FAZ am Sonntag, Financial Times Deutschland, Focus, Handelsblatt, and Welt am Sonntag. As
shown in Table 3, they account for 1,495 articles in our sample (see S2 Appendix for exact
number for each outlet). However, it is important to note that unlike in other countries (e.g.,
Great Britain), there are no hard right-wing newspapers in Germany, as even the most pro-
nounced right-leaning paper (i.e., Die Welt) mostly adheres to liberal-pluralist principles [61].
The raw data collected from legacy media as well as from the counter-movements’ online
communication is available to all interested researchers upon request via the open repository
of GESIS (https://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.5183). The R code produced for the data collection as
well as for the analyses is publicly available on GitHub (https://github.com/ikmb-unibe/coab_
so2).
2.4 Measuring discursive resonance
Our analysis is based on digital text on climate change of the skeptical counter-movement
(online) and of legacy media (offline) over the course of two years. In a first step, we used a
quantitative approach to check whether the resonance of the skeptics in the media has grown
continuously. To do so, we aggregated the data on the level of single months and examined the
discursive resonance using different computational methods. We acknowledge that this
approach only captures the monthly correlation of the agendas and we therefore make no
claims as to any strict causal relationships between counter- and mainstream-arenas. In a sec-
ond step, however, we used a qualitative approach to reveal whether discursive resonance
pushes skeptics’ frames, positions and actors occasionally. Of course, such patterns of
increased discursive resonance may well be caused by third, unobserved factors, which play an
important role in creating opportunities of discursive resonance. Such factors are hard to find
in the continuous analysis whereas it is one strength of our qualitative analysis of the docu-
ments that such factors are detected. Table 4 provides an overview of the analytical techniques
applied.
Table 3. Key figures of the offline sample.
Outlets Articles
Type Conservative media 9 1’495
Other media 6 2’616
Total 15 4’111
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240089.t003
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In order to detect continuous resonance, we employed a variety of computational methods
and quantitative procedures. We used a bag-of-words topic model to detect shifts in the fram-
ing competition, employed a purpose-trained classifier algorithm to distinguish positions on
climate change, and relied on a semi-automated named entity recognition procedure to show
which actors participated in the debate. In the following paragraphs, we will shortly introduce
each of these methods.
To identify frames, we relied on probabilistic topic modeling [68], an unsupervised method
of automated content analysis [69], that helps unravel latent or hidden thematic structures of
text material using Bayesian statistics. Topic models are mixed-membership models, meaning
that every document consists of a mixture of different topics. Each document can therefore be
understood as probability distribution over a set of topics and is best described by those topics
with the highest probabilities. A topic, on the other hand, is defined by a “probability distribu-
tion over the entire corpus’ vocabulary” [70 p97] and represents a latent pattern of word (co-)
occurrences. Those words that have a high probability within a topic are the ones that define it
thematically.
In order to become meaningful, topics must be interpreted in a qualitative process and
against the backdrop of a theory. Depending on both the corpus and the theory, the resulting
thematic structures (i.e., probability distribution over words) may either be interpreted as
actual topics (e.g., environment versus economy), as issues (e.g., climate change), or as frames
(e.g., the emphasis on the scientific consensus), depending on the underlying type of text cor-
pus [71]. As explained before, we understand frames as “central organizing idea[s] or story
line[s]” [47 p143] that represent the “particular ways [in which] issues are presented” [72
p184]. In combination with the fact that we have keyword-cleaned texts, all dealing with cli-
mate change, and thus a relatively coherent corpus, we consider it valid to interpret the result-
ing latent patterns of word (co-)occurrences as frames or interpretative packages (see also
[73]).
For our analysis, we rely on the commonly used and well documented structural topic
model framework (STM; [74, 75]). As we removed duplicate web pages to compute our STM,
it is based on a total of 17,120 text documents. This was done to avoid a bias in favor of the
duplicated documents. As topic models only work with monolingual text material, we trans-
lated all the vocabulary of the English web pages into German before calculating the model
[76]. We applied several common preprocessing steps in order to extract as much information
from the corpus as possible. This included the removal of punctuation, conversion to all lower-
case, removal of words with less than three characters, removal of stop words (e.g., “und”,
“oder”, “auf”, “der”), stemming, and the removal of words that appear in less than 0.5% and in
more than 99% of all documents (relative pruning). To decide on the number of topics (K), we
combined data-driven indicators with a qualitative assessment of the interpretability of
Table 4. Methods and techniques used to measure discursive resonance.
Resonance
form
Approach Discursive indicator Method Measure
Continuous Quantitative Frames Topic model (STM, unsupervised): identification of frames
used in documents
Jensen-Shannon divergence (ordinary least
squares regression)
Positions Classifier (SVM, supervised): categorization of sentence as
advocate, skeptical, or irrelevant
Difference of skeptical sentences rates on-/offline
(ordinary least squares regression)
Participants Named-entity recognition (supervised/manual content
analysis): identification of (non-)skeptical actors
Difference of skeptical actors rates on-/offline
(ordinary least squares regression)
Selective Qualitative Frames, Positions,
Participants
Identification of critical moments based on quantitative indicators, followed by an in-depth study of the factors
triggering such discursive resonance.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240089.t004
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different solutions [70]. To do so, we first calculated 8 models with 5 to 40 topics. We then
compared these models based on standard measures (i.e., held-out likelihood, semantic coher-
ence, residuals). The models with 20 and 30 topics were selected for the final interpretation
step. Based on both the topic top words and particularly relevant documents, the topics were
interpreted by two people. The guiding question was whether top words and documents repre-
sent an interpretable and coherent frame. If both persons came to the same conclusion, the
topic was labelled, otherwise it was excluded from the analysis. In the end, we chose the model
with 20 topics, whereby five uninterpretable topics were excluded and two similar topics were
merged (all labels and top words are shown in S3 Appendix). The calculation was done in R
using the stm package [77].
To compare the similarity of frames used by climate skeptics in their online communication
and in mass media reporting, we relied on the Jensen-Shannon divergence (JSD). This is a
smoothed and symmetric derivative of the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, which is a com-
mon measure when comparing distributions [78]. The normalized outcomes of the JSD can be
used as measure of similarity between two probability distributions and is therefore well suited
for the comparison of the topic distributions of our online and offline samples. A JSD of 0
would indicate complete congruence of the two distributions (i.e., the same frames used by the
climate change skeptics and the legacy media). A JSD of 1 would mean completely different
distributions and thus completely different frames. If climate skeptics succeed in influencing
the thematic relevance structure of legacy media in a continuous way, we would therefore
expect a declining JSD over the course of our two-year period of analysis. To detect whether
there is a significant trend, we used ordinary least square regression following the approach
taken by Farrell in his study on the influence of the climate change counter-movement [13].
Despite its relative simplicity, we find a linear model well suited to detect continuous reso-
nance as the underlying theoretical idea is that of long-term discourse convergence.
To identify positions, we relied on a trained classifier algorithm, or, more precisely, on a lin-
ear support vector machine [79]. This classifier algorithm was used to categorize each single
sentence in our documents as either advocate-leaning, skeptical-leaning, or irrelevant. In con-
trast to topic modeling, a classifier follows the logic of automated supervised content analyses
[69]. This means that it follows the logic of a pre-defined coding scheme. In a first step, this
coding scheme guides a manual content analysis of a text sample, distinguishing skeptical
from advocative sentences. In a second step, the manually coded material serves as learning
material for the computer algorithm [80]. To account for the two languages in our data set we
trained two models, one for English documents and one for German documents.
To train the models, we used an active learning scenario. This means that we trained and
checked the two models in several iterations, using manually coded sentences as training mate-
rial and benchmark. The initial training set consisted of sentences from advocates and skeptics
as well as of sentences that have nothing to do with climate change. The inclusion of such ran-
dom sentences is crucial in order to be able to detect also irrelevant sentences in the data set.
This initial training sets were used to train a first model for each language that was then
applied to 10’000 random uncategorized sentences of our corpus in the respective language.
After this first classification, the result was evaluated by a team of three human coders. The
evaluated sentences were then added to the initial training data and the models were trained
once again (hyperparameter C optimized by cross validation to avoid overfitting). We repeated
this process three times, until we could not improve the classifiers’ performance anymore
(measured by k-fold cross validation). To measure the accuracy of the classifiers, we treated
the manually coded sentences as gold standard and compared them with the machine coded
sentences. After the third iteration, the overall accuracy measured by the harmonic mean of
precision and recall (micro-average) was F1 = 0.83 for the English model and F1 = 0.85 for the
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German model (see S4 Appendix for macro-average F1 of different categories). These are satis-
fying accuracy values. Classification was done in R using the LibLineaR package [81].
To assess the discursive resonance as regards positions, we analyzed whether the increase in
skeptical sentences online is correlated with the share of skeptical sentences in the media. To
do so, we first compare the share of skeptical sentences online and offline and study whether
the differences of these shares increases or decreases. To detect potential trends, we again use
linear regression models.
Finally, to identify skeptical actors within the debate, we relied on named-entity recognition
(NER). It is a set of procedures to extract categories, like people’s names, organizations, and
locations, from unstructured texts (for a short description, see [82]). To identify all actors in
our sample of climate change web pages and media articles, we first used a list of around 1.3
million known named-entities as a look-up list (a lexical approach). On the one hand, the list
consisted of names of prominent individuals (e.g., “Angela Merkel”) and multi-word units
(e.g., “market economy”) that were not necessarily related to the climate change issue. On the
other hand, it contained 10,095 names of actors that we had identified as important for the
public discourse on climate change using manual content analysis [83]. In order to identify
actors who were not on the list, we used two probabilistic sequence classifiers (English and
German), which we trained specifically for this purpose using the list. We used conditional
random field models from the Stanford CoreNLP package [84] as classifier algorithms.
To show discursive resonance as regards debates’ participants, we needed to add informa-
tion to the named entities extracted. Thus, we relied on the list of 10,095 manually coded
actors. For each actor, we coded the position on climate change—more precisely, whether the
actor thinks that climate change is occurring and whether he/she sees it as a problem. This
allowed us to identify the most important climate skeptics in our corpus. Using Kripendorff’s
alpha again, the reliability scores were 0.69 for the first variable (occurrence of climate change)
and 0.75 for the second (climate change seen as problem). This was measured as master-coder
reliability based on a random sample of 30 actors. Both manually coded variables achieved sat-
isfactory reliability scores.
Using these procedures, we identified a total of 46,901 skeptical actors, 443,452 advocative
actors, and 411,955 actors without a clear position on climate change in our corpus. As before,
we analyzed whether an increase in mentions of skeptical actors online was associated with an
increase in mentions in the media. Again, we first compare the shares of skeptical actors used
by both the skeptics and the legacy media. We then use the difference of the shares as diver-
gence measure. Simple linear regression models are used to check for a significant convergence
or divergence respectively.
To detect selective resonance, we used a qualitative approach. In a first step, we identified
critical moments in the time series obtained by the computational procedures described
above. Critical moments are points in time when the frames found online and offline were
more similar than usual, when there were an increase of skeptical sentences in the media cov-
erage, or when an unusual number of skeptical actors were mentioned in offline reporting.
Once we identified such a critical moment, we examined the exact frame agenda in the offline
corpus in this month and then determined the frames responsible for the increased similarity
of the agendas. This means that we searched for frames that received an unusually high
amount of attention in the legacy media’s reporting during this month. In a second step, we
used this information to search for documents in our offline corpus in which the particular
frames have a high proportion (>0.6). At the same time, the documents had to show a high
number of skeptical actors or skeptical sentences. In this way, we identified documents with a
high chance of selective resonance. In a third step, we looked at each of these documents as a
separate case and tried to identify and describe both moments of selective resonance and
PLOS ONE How climate change skeptics (try to) spread their ideas
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240089 October 5, 2020 12 / 23
factors causing it through in-depth reading. In the final step, we synthesized the knowledge
gained from the case studies and put them into the wider context of legacy media coverage on
climate change.
3. Results
As a basis for our further analysis of the three indicators for discursive resonance, we first
looked at the salience of climate change in legacy media (Fig 2A)—a prerequisite to study the
resonance of different venues in this issue. Fig 2A shows that legacy media reported frequently
on climate change. However, two observations are worth mentioning: first, conservative
media are responsible for only a third of the articles in our sample (although they constitute
more than half of our sample). The other two thirds of the articles on climate change are pub-
lished by left-leaning media and media without a clear political profile (hereinafter referred to
as “other media”). Second, the volume of reporting on climate change decreased in both media
categories over the course of the two years analyzed as indicated by the sloping regression line
in Fig 2A.
3.1 Continuous resonance
Frame resonance. We speak of a continuous frame resonance if the Jensen-Shannon
divergence (JSD) becomes significantly smaller in the two-year period. This would indicate a
convergence of online and offline agendas as we calculated the thematic divergence between
websites of climate change skeptics and legacy media. However, the trend lines in Fig 2B and
the regression models reported in Table 5 show that there was no significant decrease of the
JSD for both conservative and other legacy media. As the coefficients indicate, the distance
between online and offline agendas remain almost the same over the whole time period.
Therefore, neither of the two legacy media types can be attributed a continuous thematic
resonance.
Beyond, a comparison between conservative and other media reveals that there is no indica-
tion that conservative media are more open for the skeptics’ frames. In contrast Fig 2B even
indicates that the Jensen-Shannon divergence (JSD) between the aggregated online and offline
frame agendas is slightly bigger for conservative media than for other media. This means that
the climate change framing in left-leaning media and media without a clear political profile is,
overall, closer to that of the climate change skeptics on the web compared to that of conserva-
tive newspapers and magazines which clearly contradicts the expectations about the special
role of right-wing media in giving voice to climate skeptics as regards frames.
Positional resonance. With regard to positional resonance, the green trend line with a
positive incline in Fig 2C indicates that climate change skeptics became more radical over
time. However, the degree of verbal radicalization is marginal (β = 0.0005) and only weakly
significant (p = 0.0687) as the coefficients in Table 5 show. Nevertheless, every tenth sentence
on an average skeptic’s website explicitly expresses a skeptical position on climate change. The
traditional media, however, remain unaffected by this development as the blue and red lines in
Fig 2C indicate. The proportion of skeptical sentences is almost identical for both the legacy
media categories and remains low over the entire time period. Accordingly, it is no surprise
that the divergence between online and offline spheres reported in Fig 2D increases over time.
In case of the conservative media, the increase (β = 0.0005, se = 0.0003) is even weakly signifi-
cant (p = 0.0904). Despite their radicalization, the climate change skeptics have therefore not
succeeded in provoking a continuous resonance in legacy media regards their positions.
Resonance as regards participants of a debate. As Fig 2E shows, there is no increase in
the visibility of skeptical actors in legacy media over time (blue and red line). As the average
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Fig 2. General salience of climate change and resonance of skeptical discourse for the period from July 2012 to June 2014. Plots (A-F): Salience of
climate change in legacy media (A), divergence measures (B, D, F), share measures (C, E). Shown are the separate measurements for the websites of
climate change skeptics, conservative legacy media, and other media (points) as well as the trend line for each of the three categories (lines). A trend line
with positive incline indicates an growing number of articles on climate change (A), growing share of skeptical actors (C), growing share of skeptical
actors (E), growing thematic divergence (B), growing positional divergence (D), growing divergence regarding the visibility of skeptical actors (F).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240089.g002
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share of 2% shows, legacy media hardly give skeptical actors a platform, regardless of the
media’s political profile. At the same time, there is no increase in the number of skeptical
actors on the skeptics’ websites (green line in Fig 2E). As a result, the divergence between
online and offline did not change significantly over the period examined (Fig 2F, coefficients
in Table 5). This is true for both conservative and all other media over the whole two years.
This means that there is no convergence of the discourses of the skeptical counter-movement
and the dominant public discourse as presented in legacy media. Thus, there are no continu-
ous resonance effects here either.
Overall, no continuous discursive resonance can be identified. There is no evidence that
German legacy media are increasingly following climate skeptics over the course of time.
Interestingly, hardly any difference is found between conservative and other legacy media as
regards frames, positions and actors, with some counter-intuitive exceptions as regards the
framing of the issue. For the German conservative media, we can therefore not confirm what
has been shown for their US counterparts—that conservative media in general are allies to cli-
mate change skeptics. German legacy media do not seem to offer a platform for climate change
skeptics.
3.2 Selective resonance
The lack of continuous resonance between legacy media and climate skeptics in Germany as
regards frames, positions and actors, results in a debate that is fragmented. On a thematic
dimension, this fragmentation becomes visible in Fig 3. It makes clear that German legacy
media frame the issue of climate change almost exclusively in terms of the German economy/
consumption patterns. This one frame captures most of the mainstream debate, whereas cli-
mate skeptics employ a variety of frames with “doubting the climate science consensus,” “cli-
mate science skepticism,” and “measuring climate change” being the most prominent. On a
positional dimension, this fragmentation is shown in the radicalization of climate skeptics’
communication that is not at all reflected in the mainstream debate (Fig 2C and 2D). In sum,
climate skeptics still form a separated counter public in Germany in the time of analysis, that is
occupied with its own frames, radicalizes its positions and is not taking-over the economy
frame dominating the mainstream debate. The mainstream public, in contrast, is occupied
with discussing the economic consequences of climate change while largely ignoring the skep-
tics’ frames, positions and actors.
Does this, however, mean that German legacy media are immune to climate skeptics’
frames, positions, and allies, or do we find indicators of selective resonance among the differ-
ent venues? Our data indicate that, in September 2013, selective resonance might have
occurred. In this month, the Jensen-Shannon divergence was noticeably low, which indicates
thematic resonance (blue dot in Fig 2B). As shown in Fig 3, the frame, “climate science skepti-
cism,” peaked in the legacy media in this particular month, reducing the attention on the dom-
inating frame as regards the German economy, both in the conservative as well as in the other
Table 5. Regression coefficients (β) for divergence measures.
Thematic resonance Positional resonance Actor resonance
Media Conservative Other Conservative Other Conservative Other
Constant 0.3467 (0.0176) 0.3137 (0.0162) 0.0750 (0.0044) 0.0795 (0.0042) 0.0502 (0.0073) 0.0446 (0.0074)
Time 0.0003 (0.0013) -0.0006 (0.0012) 0.0005. (0.0003) 0.0005 (0.0003) -0.0001 (0.0005) 0.0003 (0.0005)
Standard errors in parentheses. ��� p < 0.001, �� p < 0.01, � p < 0.05,. p < 0.1.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240089.t005
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legacy media. This thematic resonance was accompanied by an above average share of skepti-
cal sentences in the legacy media (Fig 2C).
Looking at the articles that have both a high probability of the “climate science skepticism”
frame and a high proportion of skeptical sentences, it can be seen that their publication was
triggered by two events: the publication of the final draft of the 5th assessment report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the publication of an oceanographic
study in the journal Nature. While the assessment report contains some more conservative
projections than previous versions, the Nature study [85] addresses the lower than predicted
temperature increases in recent decades. Both aspects—the IPCC’s supposed failure/fraud and
the plateau in the temperature curve—can be regarded as critical events, changing visibility
structures within the climate change debates. The skeptics have successfully used these events
to put forward their alleged counter-evidence for climate change referring to the news value
“surprise”.
Apparently, these scientific publications have opened a window of opportunity for skeptics’
frames and positions to reach out to legacy media’s agenda. A closed-up reading of the relevant
articles, however, shows that such punctual visibility of skeptics’ frames and positions in the
legacy media have been opposed by the journalists themselves: they criticize skeptics’ interpre-
tations and, thus, accompany this selective resonance with their own critical examination of
skeptics’ arguments.
4. Discussion
In this article, we examined how different venues—the online venue of climate change skeptics
and the mainstream discourse—resonate. Given that counter-movements are by definition
oriented towards the mainstream of political debates [8], this paper has investigated the oppo-
site relationship, more challenging from the point of view of democratic theory: do the online
counter-movements of climate skeptics resonate in traditional media? We have studied three
Fig 3. Topic proportions in legacy media and online. Mean topic proportions over time in legacy media and on websites of climate skeptics.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240089.g003
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types of discursive resonance: the media’s adoption of climate change skeptics’ frames (the-
matic resonance), the inclusion of skeptical positions (positional resonance), and the mention-
ing of skeptical actors (actor resonance). In addition to this, we have distinguished continuous
from selective resonance patterns.
As a first major result of our study, we find no evidence for continuous resonance. We find
neither an increase of skeptical frames in the legacy media’s coverage, nor an increase of skep-
tical positions or actors. Second, however, this does not mean that skeptical voice are invisible
in traditional media, as resonance may occur only selectively at single points in time. Our data
reveal that specific events—in our case, the publication of scientific reports—can open a small
window of opportunity that sees skeptical frames resonate to a greater degree in the media.
While even in these cases skeptical positions remain contested by the media, their mere inclu-
sion serves to ratify their views as legitimate contributions to the debate. This can be seen by
counter-movements as a first step towards greater possibilities of participation in political
debates.
Third, the ideological profile of newspapers and magazines in Germany did not turn out to
be relevant: Conservative legacy media in Germany did not give greater resonance to climate
skeptical voices. This strongly contrasts with the US, where conservative outlets play an impor-
tant role in amplifying climate skepticism and are part of the “climate change denial machine”
[23 p147]. This finding also underlines the necessity to move research beyond the US context
to better understand the role played by different context factors. In Germany, for example, the
landscape of traditional media is substantially less polarized than in the US, and–contra the
two component theory—journalists across the political spectrum appear to display no differ-
ence in their orientation towards news factors. However, while there is no qualitative differ-
ence between media outlets in terms of news factor emphasis, there is a telling quantitative
distinction between them: while our sample includes more conservative than centrist or left-
leaning media, climate change is much less salient in them. Lacking established skeptical actors
on the national stage they could use as opportune witnesses in their reporting, conservative
media resort to downplaying the issue by allocating less space to it.
How can we explain the lack of continuous resonance in the German case? News value the-
ory hints at three factors (e.g., [41]). First, the network of German climate change skeptics is
rather weak. Most of the web pages in the sample are from foreign actors, in particular from
the United States, and included in the German issue network by German skeptics. However,
but neither the scope nor the language of these actors is necessarily German, and, as such, they
are no points of reference for journalists, whose reporting is primarily oriented towards
domestic politics. In news value terminology, they lack both the “closeness” and the “prestige”.
Second, German skeptics lack prominent speakers, whose status would guarantee continuous
resonance. Third, the climate skeptical discourse is largely uncoupled from the policy cycle
and its coverage by the media. Whereas news outlets followed the political that revolved
around the economic aspects of climate change, skeptics discussed unrelated, more fundamen-
tal questions (e.g., whether it occurs or whether one can trust climate scientists), which did not
fit into the relevance structure of news reporting. This leaves few options for climate skeptics
and their resonance opportunities are mostly selective: without prestigious actors and disen-
gaged from the policy cycle, they rely on event-driven news factors. The “surprise” news factor
becomes an important element, and our study shows that skeptics rely on external events like
the publication of scientific reports that—from a mainstream perspective—reveal surprising
findings.
Our results point out that German legacy media have not played a prominent role in
spreading the ideas of climate skeptics. On the contrary, they seemed to fulfill their task of
informing the public about climate change in accordance with the scientific consensus (e.g.,
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[27]), and criticized the climate skeptical positions on which they reported, as our qualitative
case study shows. While this conforms to the normative standards associated with journalism,
the media largely reduced their climate change coverage to the economic aspect, neglecting its
political dimension or its international scope. This one-sided focus may hamper the ability to
act politically and actually solve the climate crisis.
Moreover, the media’s exclusionary practice towards the skeptical counter-movement has
its drawbacks: those supporting the counter-positions might well develop a feeling of alien-
ation and misrepresentation. As a consequence, these people may turn to alternative digital
information sources, while their distrust of traditional media increases—a trend that has
occurred in recent years in Germany on the political far-right. The media’s decision to refrain
for instance from questioning the scientific consensus might well result in losing their role as
legitimate gatekeepers in the debate in the eyes of some parts of the population.
Do our results mean that the engagement of counter-movements’ online has no effect?
Although skeptics lack a continuous resonance on legacy media agendas, they still have a selec-
tive one. Counter-movements’ online communication serves as a “reservoir of ideas” from
which they can draw as soon as a window of opportunity opens [12]. However, further
research needs to show whether counter-movements’ online communication fulfills more
functions. It might be that climate skeptical ideas and positions are disseminated without the
help of traditional media. This raises the question of diffusion patterns of climate skepticism
and the role played by traditional media, digital outlets, blogs and social media—and how they
differ between countries. And depending on the national context, can skeptics bypass the
media and directly influence politics and, in this way, gain legitimacy and a wider access to
citizens?
Beyond this, future research needs to dig deeper into the conditions under which media
resonance occurs. To further understand continuous resonance and the relevance of the news
factor “prominence/elite,” Germany would certainly be an interesting case. Here, the recent
electoral gains of the right-wing “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD) have also brought some
climate change skeptics into parliament, which in turn might help skeptical voices to become
more prominent in traditional media. In addition, more research is needed to understand
which specific types of events and conditions make selective resonance more likely. In our
research, climate skeptics have relied on external events to promote their ideas. However, can
counter-movements create events themselves to advance their agenda (see [86])? Knowledge
about these events and conditions might help make journalists more sensitive in their report-
ing. Finally, more comparative research is needed to gain a better understanding of digital dis-
course strategies employed by climate skeptics and their resonance in media coverage. Our
study already shows that the patterns we observe in Germany are not comparable to the ones
in the US. We thus need to systematically study context factors.
Finally, there are a number of limitations that we need to address: First, we speak of the res-
onance of climate skeptical discourse in the media. Statistically, this corresponds to correla-
tions models and we are aware that we cannot draw conclusions about causal relationships in
a strict sense. Particularly with regard to frames, it might be climate skeptics whose discourse
is influenced by the mainstream debate covered by the media. Second, empirically, the distinc-
tion between frames and positions is not as clear as presented by the theory. Frames define the
relevance structure of an issue, regardless of the position of the actors. However, the results of
our topic model suggest that some frames are aligned with a specific position (e.g., the denial
of weather consequences reflects the skeptical position). At the same time, none of the frames
is solely used by one side of the debate [12], and we are confident that our analysis captures the
three crucial components of political debates: frames, positions, and actors. Third, our named-
entity approach did not allow us to distinguish between speakers and addressees. However,
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this distinction is important to assess the role of the actors in the media reports. Beyond this,
the automated approaches failed to reveal how journalists reacted to an increase in skeptical
frames and positions. Here, only a qualitative case study can show journalists’ critical reac-
tions. To this end, additional methodological work is needed.
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